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DELAY IN COURTS OF REVIEW IN CRIMINAL OASES.
RANK K. DUNN.

Newspapeis and legal journals, bar associations, lawyers and judges
are quite generally united in a demand for reform in the administration.
of the criminal law and. frequently the demand is accompanied by criticism of the methods of procedure of courts of review in criminal cases
which are held largely responsible for delays and failures in the administration of justice. Whether conditions are so desperate that the administration of the criminal law may be properly said to have-broken down
as an unworkable machine, or to be a disgrace to civilization, as has been
emphatically stated by gentlemen whose prominent positions give to
their words weight with the public, may well be doubted. It will hardly
be accepted as a fair statement of the administration of the criminal law
in America, as has also been declared in the same manner, that if a man
has the means to employ able counsel, he can in the great majority of
cases escape punishment for crime. The critics of the courts seize upon
an extreme case decided in any one of the State or Federal courts where
an apparently just conviction has been reversed upon what may be regarded as a merely technical reason and generalizing from it, produce
articles having a tendency to induce in the general reader the belief
that such cases are fairly typical of the attitude of the courts toward criminal prosecutions. The Supreme Court of Ohio, a year ago, reversed a
conviction for murder in which the name of the victim was alleged in the
indictment as Percy Stuckey, alias Frank McCormick, because while the
murder of Frank McCormick was proved, there was no evidence that he
was the same person as Percy Stuckey or that there ever was such a person as Percy Stuckey. Goodlove v. State, 82 Ohio State, 365. The
Supreme Court of Missouri reversed a conviction because of the omission of the word "the" before "State" in the formal conclusion of tie
indictment which should have been "against the peace and dignity of the
State." State v. Campbell, 210 Mo. 202.
These cases have been published far and wide and hare been frequently referred to as illustrations of the assumed dislposition of the courts
of appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases to disregard the merits and
reverse judgments upon 'the most technical errors appearing in the record without reference to the guilt of the accused. Ordinarily no reference is made to the decisions in other cases to the contrary of the cases
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referred to or to the vast number of decisions in which the courts of
last resort have sustained convictions upon records abounding in technical error which was held not to have prejudiced the accused.
It is not proposed to defend or discuss these cases or other decisions
in which it may be thought that undue weight has been given to technical or formal objections. It is no doubt true that cases occur where new
trials are granted by appellate tribunals for 'irregularities in the proceedings in no way affecting the merits. All courts are likely to err in
that .way sometimes and some courts are perhaps more prone to do so
than others. Whatever may be the effect of criminal procedure in appellate courts elsewhere upon the prompt and effective administration of the
law and punishment of crime, the question of importance to the Illinois
lawyer on this subject is the procedure and practice in his own State.
This article does not concern itself with any laxity of administration of
the law arising out of the organization of the trial court, or the methods
of those charged with its enforcement, whether lawyers, judges or jurors, but only with the question of criminal procedure in appellate courts.
It may be observed, however, that no method of criminal procedure
will secure the conviction, prompt or otherwise, of criminals in a community which has no respect for law. or desire to have it enfoiced. Men
guilty of crime and men innocent of crime have, in various parts of the
country within the last few months, been brutally murdered-banged,
shot to death and burned to death-by crowds of American citizens in thc
presence of crowds of approving men, women and children, who also were
American citizens. Has any one of the many who were well known in
the respective communities to be guilty of these murders been convicted?
How many have ever been brought to trial? How many indictments hav3
been found? The difficulty in these cases does not lie in the method of
procedure but in the public sentiment which condones the crime. If
murder is condoned, is it surprising that the administration of the criminal law proves to be an unworkable machine in other cases, and that
men escape the punishment for other crimes not because of the methods
of the courts but because of the public sentiment of disregard for law?
Some delay necessarily arises in the preparation, argument, consideration and determination of an appeal. Only Judge Lynch's court
adninisters with absolute promptness that which it does administer instead of justice. There only can those who demand punishment instant
upon the supposed commission of crime be satisfied. Elsewhere established rules and recognized rights that prevail in all civilized tribunals
which attempt to administer justice judicially necessarily require the
delay indispensable for the orderly procedure of accusation, trial, de-
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fense, argument, consideration. Such delay cannot be avoided and such
delay exists in the Supreme Court of Illinois. In that court a criminal
case is decided, except in very rare instances, within seventy days after
its submission. This certainly indicates no lack of promptness in dealing
with criminal cases. The punishment for crime cannot be long delayed.
by suing'out a writ of error. Even in the case of a heinous crime, there
must be time for deliberation, orderly procedure, dispassionate judgment.
Some judgments of conviction are reversed and in some cases the reversals are for technical errors. But the attitude of the court toward*
technical error in the record of criminal cases is clearly expressed in the
opinions of the court. Where the result reached by a judgment is clearly
right, the court has frequently said it will not be reversed for errors
which do not affect the substantial merits of the case. This has been
said in substance in reference to errors in the admission and rejection
of evidence, in the giving and refusing of instructions and in the conduct of opposing counsel. Wilson v. People, 94 Ill. 299; Kirby v. People,
123 id. 426; Ochs v. People, id. 398; Johnson v. People, 202 id. 53; Wistrand v. People, 218 id. 323. Where the verdict is clearly justified by
competent evidence, a judgment will not be reversed for the admission
of incompetent evidence which could not reasonably have affected the result. People v. N all, 242 Ill. 284; People v. Weston, 236 id. 104; DuBois
v. People, 200 id. 157; Jennings v. People, 189 id. 320; Jackson v. People, 126 id. 139. So where it appears from the whole record that error
in the instructions given to the jury did not prejudice the defendant and
substantial justice has been done, the judgment will not be reversed
for such error. People v. Anderson, 239 Ill. 168; People.v. Casey, 231 id.
261; Bleich v. People,-227 id. 80; Murello v. People, 226 id. 388; Roberts v. People, id. 296; Dunn v. People, 109 id.-635.
The last sixty volumes of the Illinois reports (volumes 191 to 250)
cover practically the ten years from June, 1901, to June, 1911. They
contain 258 criminal cases. Omitting those which involve only the
constitutional validity of particular acts of legislation undertaken in the
exercise of the police power, there remain 243 of which 150 were affirmed and 93 reversed. "Somewhat more than three-fifths of the cases
were affirmed and somewhat less than two-fifths were reversed. ..The xeversals for the most part were either upon the merits of the case after
a consideration of the evidence or for errors of the court in.instructing
the jury or receiving evidence which were considered so impoitant as to
have probably affected the verdict. Many judgments were affirmed in
which similar errors were shown by the record but in which the court
was convinced that the verdict was just and that the jury could not rea-.
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* sonably have arrived at any other conclusion. The latest of these cases was
the Oleminson murder case, in which the court found very grave and
substantial error in the admission of incompetent testimony of so prejudicial a character as would have requIred the reversal of the judgment,
if the competent evidence had left any room for doubt of the defendant's
guilt. The court, however, in view of the conclusive proof of* the defendant's guilt, affirmed the judgment in spite of the manifest error in
the admission. of the evidence. People v. Cleminson, 250 IlL. 135. In
People v. Weston, 236- Ill; 1.04, in which the defendants were convicted
of rape, the court referring to incompetent evidence said: "Besides -there
was abundance of competent uncontradicted testimony sufficient to sustain this verdict, and the result would undoubtedly have been the same if
this incompetent evidence had not been admitted. Where this is true,
error in the admission of incompetent evidence does not -require a reversal of the judgment." The same principle was applied in People v. De
Pew, 237 Ill. 574.
In a few cases reported in these sixty volumes reversals were had
on strictly technical grounds. An information in the Municipal Court
of Chicago presented by a person other than the State's Attorney is required by statute to be sworn to. The court overruled the defendant's
motion to quash an unsworn information and a conviction followed. -It
was reversed because a defendant is entitlea to a trial according to the
law of the land and the form of proceeding prescribed by the statute must
be observed. People v. Zlotnici, 246 Ill. 185. In March v. People, 226
Ill. 464, an indictment for murder was quashed because, the grand jury
which returned it was not selected as required by the statute at a lawful
meeting of the county board. These objections did not affect the guilt
or innocence of the defendants, but the proceedings were in violation of
a statutory requirement and therefore not authorized by law.
Reversals were also had in a conviction for larceny where the ownership of the stolen property was alleged in the "American Express Company, an association," People v. Brander, 244 Ill. 26; ;in another where
the value of the stolen property was not alleged, People v. Silbertrust.
236 Ill. 144; in a conviction for receiving stolen. property where the indictment alleged ownershp in a corporation and the proof showed it
in an individual, People v. Aldrich, 225 Ill. 610; in a conviction for
forgery where the indictment did not purport to set out an, exact copy
of the forged instrument, People v. Tilden, 242 Ill. 536; in a conviction
for obtaining money by means of the confidence game when the.proof was
that the property obtained was a check, People v. Lory, 229 Ill. 268.
In these cases no statutory right was violated, but in, each case a well-
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recognized and thoroughly-established principle of the common law had
been disregarded. The law was binding upon the court as well as upon
the defendant and whether he was guilty or not guilty the court had no
right to set aside an inconvenient rule of law which prevented his conviction. If the rule ought to be changed it was tieprovince of the legislature, not of the court to change it.
In several cases reversals were had because the juries found thedefendants guilty of a part only of the elements of the offense as in People
v. Leyzen, 231 Ill. 193, where in four counts the defendant was charged
with an assault with a deadly weapon with intent to inflict bodily injury,
two of the counts charging the assault to have been made, no considerable provocation appearing, and the other two charging the assault, the
circumstances showing an abandoned and malignant heart. The verdict
found the defendant guilty of assault with a deadly weapon, with intent
to inflict bodily injury, but contained no finding as to the other statutory
elements of the crime charged in the indictment. Oases similar in principle were Donovan v. People, 215 Ill. 520; Mai v. People, 224 id. 414;
People v. Lee, 237 id. 222; People v. Morton, 245 id. 530. In none of
these cases was the verdict merely guilty; or guilty as charged in some
count of the indictment, but in each case the defendant was found guilty
of certain elements necessary to constitute the crime and there was no
finding as to some other element equally essential.
The court observes the rule that judgments will not be reversed for
harmless error which could not have affected the result. Where incompetent evidence is received or competent evidence rejected, where the law
is incorrectly stated to the jury or a correct statement is refused, where
the judge has been guilty of improper conduct in the trial, the judgment may still have been rendered for the right party and perhaps no
different judgment- could have been rendered. Where this clearly appears the judgment should be affirmed. But frequently it is impossible
for a reviewing court to say that the error actually did or did not affect
the result. The tribunal authorized to pass upon the case is the jury and
where the court can see that a jury acting reasonably might have arrived
at a different result if the error complained of had not been committed,
the defendant is entitled to the judgment of the jury. It is only where
substantial justice has not been done because the defendant's guilt has
not been established, or he has been denied the benefit of some constitutional or statutory right, or the court has proceeded in violation of some
established rule of law, that a judgment will be reversed. It may be that
some or many of these rules of law should be changed, but the constituZ'
tional right and power to change them rests with the legislative and not
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the judicial department of the State. The court might disregard them
on the ground that they did not involve substantial right and justice.
The measure of the defendant's rights would then be the judgment of
the court in the particular case and the law would rest in the court's
discretion. It might be desirable, if constitutional obstacles did not intervene, that the review by the Supreme Court of the record of a criminal
trial should consist only of an examination of the evidence to ascertain
whether the defendant had been guilty of some offense against tht law
and whether the punishment fitted the crime. Such a change is, however, impracticable. The delay or failure of justice in Illinois on account
of delay in the appellate tribunals or on account of reversals on technical grounds is inconsiderable. The delay and failure of justice which
occur at some times and ih some places in the trial courts may be due
in part to methods of legal procedure, but more than a reform of criminal -procedure, are needed a quickening of public opinion to a regard
for law and a desire for its observance, and a raising of the standard of
morality and justice.

